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Methods of the "War on Terror"
David Weissbrodtt and Amy Bergquist*
Many speakers in this Symposium have focused principally
on "jus ad bellum," or the international law regulating the
decision to resort to armed force. This Article concerns
principally "jus in bello," that is, international humanitarian
law or the limits on the methods of war. First, we will provide a
brief discussion of the factual and legal setting of extraordinary
rendition. Second, we will consider whether and how
humanitarian law applies to the war on terror and related
conflicts. Third, we will demonstrate how the prohibition of
transferring civilians under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention applies to extraordinary rendition. Fourth, we will
discuss several means of addressing the practice of
extraordinary rendition, under U.S., international, and foreign
law.
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I. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION DEFINED
A. THE FACTUAL SETTING
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
attempted to strengthen its efforts in pursuing alleged terrorist
actors by engaging in a covert policy known as "extraordinary
rendition." This term was originally a euphemism used to
describe an officially recognized but covert policy whereby the
United States Government or its agents would capture in a
foreign country a person accused of a crime in order to bring
that person to justice in the United States. This policy was
initially established by the Clinton administration as a means of
avoiding some of the problems that are associated with
international extradition, such as the absence of extradition
treaties and delays in effecting extradition.
The scope of extraordinary rendition has since transformed
to encompass the abduction of terror suspects not in order to
bring them to justice in the United States, but rather to send
them to a third country.1 It appears that many of the abducted
suspects have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment under
the direction, or at least acquiescence, of the U.S. Government.2
The number of extraordinary renditions has accelerated since
September 11, 2001,3 in part because of procedures approved by
President Bush for use by the CIA in transferring terror
suspects.4  Egypt appears to be the most frequently used
receiving country, and other participants include Jordan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Uzbekistan.
1. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Editorial, It's Called Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2005, at A19.
2. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's
'Extraordinary Rendition' Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; Dana Priest
& Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 'Stress and
Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions;
Suspects Possibly Taken to Nations that Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al.
4. See Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in
Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2006) 03 rev (Jan. 22, 2006); Rajiv
Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects,
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al; Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change
Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1.
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B. THE LEGAL SETTING
One way of perceiving extraordinary rendition is to look at
the line of cases dealing with the doctrine known by the Latin
phrase "mala captus bene detentus," which is defined as the
process "whereby national courts will assert in personam
jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which the
presence of the defendant was secured."5 In the 1886 decision of
Ker v. Illinois,6 the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the mala
captus doctrine in holding that the requirements of due process
were satisfied by the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
State of Illinois over Ker, who was kidnapped in Peru and
brought back to the United States to stand trial.
The most visible international case to affirm this principle
was Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann,7 in which Israeli
courts cited to U.S. case law to support the conclusion that Adolf
Eichmann's abduction in Argentina did not strip the court of
jurisdiction to try him for war crimes.8 The U.S. Supreme Court
reiterated the mala captus doctrine in the 1992 case of United
States v. Alvarez-Machain.9
While the mala captus doctrine might support the
jurisdiction of courts to bring offenders to trial, that doctrine
cannot justify the Bush administration's kidnapping of terror
suspects for torture and indefinite secret detention.
Since mala captus does not provide a basis for
extraordinary rendition, we will principally focus on the legality
of this practice under the Third10  and Fourth1  Geneva
Conventions as well as Common Article 3 of all four Geneva
5. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 250 (4th ed. 2002).
6. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
7. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [1961] IsrDC 45(3),
translated in 36 INT'L L. REP. 5 (1968), affd CrimA 336/61 Attorney-General v.
Eichmann, [1962] IsrSC 16(2033), translated in 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (1968).
8. Id. at 45-52. The court's jurisdiction over Eichmann was facilitated
because West Germany used his alleged involvement in crimes against humanity as
"a welcome pretext for withholding the customary protection due its citizens abroad"
and therefore did not intervene on Eichmann's behalf. See HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 240 (1964).
9. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention or Geneva POW Convention].
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950
[hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention].
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Conventions. 12
II. APPLICABILITY OF HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
In order to apply the Geneva Conventions to a particular
conflict, such as the activities of the United States in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the "war on terror" we must consider six
questions: 13
1. Is there an international armed conflict between two or
more High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions?
2. Is there a partial or total occupation of territory governed
by the Geneva Conventions?
3. If either of the above conditions is met, who is afforded
protected person status under the conventions?
4. What rights are afforded to those protected persons?
5. If there is no international armed conflict or occupation,
does Common Article 3 apply to the conflict, and what
protections does it provide?
6. Regardless of whether humanitarian law applies, does
human rights law also provide protections?
1. Is THERE AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN
HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES?
Article 2 is common to all four of the Geneva Conventions
and identifies situations in which the conventions apply: "The
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties . . .." The Bush administration
has argued that since al Qaeda is not a state actor and not a
party to the Geneva Conventions, the conflict between the
United States and al Qaeda is therefore not governed by the
12. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva POW Convention art. 3, supra note 10; Geneva Civilian
Convention art. 3, supra note 11.
13. See Marco Sassbli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on
Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195 (2004).
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Geneva Conventions.14 Further, the administration has argued
that the Taliban was not widely recognized as the de facto
government of Afghanistan. i5  Instead, they argued that
Afghanistan was a "failed state" and the Taliban could not
properly invoke the protections of the Geneva Conventions.16
This argument would establish an ominous precedent and
undermine a principal foundation of humanitarian law, for
many states initiate wars on the grounds that the government
of the state they are attacking is illegitimate. 17
The Bush administration has maintained that the Geneva
Conventions are "fully applicable" to the conflict in Iraq.18
Beginning with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 and
Iraq in 2003, the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq-all of
which are High Contracting Parties to the Geneva
Conventions-were engaged in armed conflict. Gradually the
United States and coalition forces began to occupy regions of
those countries. In both countries governments friendly to the
United States have been established, but tens of thousands of
U.S. and related troops are still engaged in military operations
in those countries. The Geneva Conventions continue to apply
during the period in which there is an armed conflict, and their
applicability only ceases "on the general close of military
operations." 19 Hence, the Geneva Conventions could still apply
to the continuing armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.20
Alternatively, one could ask:
14. See John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Draft Memorandum for William J.
Haynes II, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,
Jan. 9, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 48, 48-
49 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
15. See id. at 53.
16. See id. at 54-62.
17. Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross
Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 297 (1991) (noting that U.S. officials
have justified the invasion of Panama on the grounds that the Noriega Government
was illegitimate).
18. See Senior Military Official (unnamed), Defense Department Background
Briefing, May 14, 2004,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr2004O5l4-0752.html.
19. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 11, art. 6.
20. As of April 21, 2007, there have been 3,322 U.S. military casualties in Iraq,
most of which have occurred since President Bush declared the end of major combat
operations. Michael Ewens, Casualties in Iraq, http://www.antiwar.comlcasualties/
(last visited Apr. 22, 2007). One may conclude, however, that the international
armed conflict in Afghanistan continued until June 19, 2002, and the international
armed conflict in Iraq continued until June 28, 2004. See U.N. Security Council, UN
Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005) (Iraq); Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A
Role for International Law?, 75 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 76 (2004) (Afghanistan).
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2. Is THERE A PARTIAL OR TOTAL OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY
GOVERNED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?
The hostile occupation of one country by another is
governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention also known as the
Civilian Convention. 21 Article 6 of the Civilian Convention
provides that, "In the case of occupied territory, the application
of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general
close of military operations . *."..22 Hence, by the very language
of the Convention, it is irrelevant whether the occupation has
ceased; the critical measure is the close of military operations.
Occupying powers are bound by many provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, including, inter alia, Article 49. While it is
unclear whether or to what extent occupation has now ended,
most of the individuals who have been subjected to
extraordinary rendition were abducted during 2002-2004 when
the Geneva Conventions clearly applied. Moreover, to the extent
that those countries may yet to have seen a "general close of
military operations," the humanitarian law of occupation
continues to apply.
3. WHO IS AFFORDED PROTECTED PERSON STATUS?
a. Prisoners of War
In the case of a conflict of an international character
involving two or more High Contracting Parties, the Third
Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war detained as a
consequence of international armed conflict. Article 4 protects
(1) "[i]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict," (2)
"members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of [the]
armed forces," as well as (3) "members of other militias . ..
including those of organized resistance movements." The first
two categories of detainees do not need to meet any
requirements as to carrying arms openly or wearing uniforms.
The third category, that is, "members of other militias . . .
including those of organized resistance movements" do need to
comply with four additional requirements, including carrying
arms openly, "having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
21. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War 47 (Jean S. Pictet
ed., 1958) [hereinafter Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY].
22. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 19, art. 6.
[Vol. 16:2
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distance" and "conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war." The underlying rationale for the
four requirements in Article 4(A)(2) is to enable participants in
an armed conflict to know whom they may target for armed
violence. To the extent that U.S. forces appear to be able to
recognize Al Qaeda militia and the Taliban in Afghanistan or
Iraq for either attack or capture, they qualify, once detained, as
prisoners of war.
b. Civilians
Nearly every person who is not protected as a POW
automatically acquires protected person status under the
Civilian Convention. Article 4 of the Civilian Convention
extends protection to "those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals." Article 5 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention even extends protection to those persons
detained as spies or saboteurs, although they are denied the
ability to write home, which of course makes considerable sense.
c. Unlawful Combatants
The principal basis for the Bush administration's attempt to
deny the applicability of the Geneva Conventions is the claim
that certain individuals in U.S. custody are outside of the scope
of the Geneva Conventions. The administration has argued that
al Qaeda members do not comply with the four requirements
listed in Article 4(A)(2) of the POW Convention, and hence they
are not entitled to POW status,2 3 and should be classified as
unlawful combatants. Further, the administration argued that
the POW Convention "assumes the existence of 'regular' armed
forces fighting on behalf of states. "24
The Third Geneva Convention, however, makes no mention
of the term "unlawful combatants," "unlawful belligerents," or
"enemy combatants," and by its terms does not envision a
category of fighters or civilians that would be excluded from all
Geneva protections.
23. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 14, at 49-50.
24. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Vice President et al., Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002, reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 14, at 134.
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4. WHAT RIGHTS ARE AFFORDED TO THOSE PROTECTED
PERSONS?
a. Protection Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment
Under both the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions any
civilian or prisoner of war is protected from rendition to the
extent that they would be subjected to "wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment."25  These prohibitions define grave
breaches which would make any U.S. soldier or official subject
to prosecution for war crimes. Further, the United States must
not only avoid engaging in torture and inhuman treatment, but
it is responsible for ensuring respect for the prohibition of
torture and ill-treatment by other governments.
b. Special Protections Prohibiting the Transfer of Civilians
With regard to occupation, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention also includes as a grave breach "unlawful
deportation or transfer . . . of a protected person." Article 49
declares: "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the
territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."
5. ARE PERSONS PROTECTED, AND WHAT PROTECTIONS ARE
AFFORDED UNDER COMMON ARTICLE 3?
If one cannot find an armed conflict between States parties
to the Geneva Conventions and one believes that the U.S. forces
are not occupying either Afghanistan or Iraq because the United
States is working with established (albeit subservient) new
governments in those countries, then one must look elsewhere
for applicable rules of international law.
There is one provision of the four Geneva Conventions that
may still apply to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the overall war on
terror, that is, Common Article 3. Common Article 3 articulates
minimum protections for "the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties" to any of the Geneva Conventions. It
25. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 10, art. 130.
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provides "rules of humanity which are recognized as essential by
civilized nations" and applies "without any condition in regard
to reciprocity." Article 3 protects "[p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities" from "violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture." Further, Article 3 provides that those persons "shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely."
Under conditions of armed conflict not otherwise governed
by the Geneva Conventions, extraordinary rendition violates
Common Article 3 if it constitutes an effort to cause or justify
torture or cruel, humiliating, or degrading treatment.
6. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLIES,
DOES HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ALSO PROVIDE PROTECTIONS FOR
VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION?
The Bush administration argues that the Geneva
Conventions operate as lex specialis to the exclusion of other
precepts of international law. Under the administration's
argument, the "war on terror" can only be viewed within the
context of international humanitarian law and not human
rights law. But since "unlawful combatants" are not protected
under the Geneva Conventions and the Conventions do not
apply, they argue, victims of extraordinary renditions are
afforded no protection based on humanitarian law or human
rights law.26 To the contrary, as discussed above, at least
Common Article 3 applies to victims of extraordinary rendition
in the context of the "war on terror." The Supreme Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that Common Article 3 applies to the
activities of the Bush administration in detaining suspected
enemy combatants in the context of the war on terror.27
Further, international human rights law protects individuals in
all circumstances, even those not governed by humanitarian
law. Hence, even if there is no conflict or occupation,
individuals are still protected by human rights law.
Extraordinary rendition violates numerous international human
rights standards, including the International Covenant on Civil
26. See Fionnuala Ni Aolnin, The No-Gaps Approach to Parallel Application in
the Context of the War on Terror, 40 ISRAEL L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (quoting Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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and Political Rights, 2 the Convention and Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, 29 the Convention Against Torture, 30 and
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.31
III. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF
TRANSFERRING CIVILIANS UNDER ARTICLE 49 OF THE
FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AS IT APPLIES TO
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION.
If we focus on the Geneva Conventions, however, Article 49
of the Fourth Geneva Convention is the most relevant to
extraordinary rendition. Once again, it should be recalled that
Article 49 declares, "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory
to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other
country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive."
Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith (who
subsequently left his post at the Attorney General's office and
became a professor at Harvard Law School) advocated a narrow
interpretation of the prohibition on deportations and forcible
transfers from occupied territories under Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.32 Despite the clear and unequivocal
language of Article 49, Goldsmith contended that "[T]he United
States may, consistent with article 49, (1) remove 'protected
persons' who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local
immigration law; and (2) relocate 'protected persons' (whether
illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate
interrogation, for a brief but not indefinite period .. .."
28. G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
29. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered
into force Apr. 22, 1954; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S.
267, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967.
30. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987.
31. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T.
77, 100, 596 U.N.T.S. 262, 293, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.
32. Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith to Alberto Gonzales,
Permissibility of Relocating Certain 'Protected Persons' from Occupied Iraq (Mar.
19, 2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 14, at 366.
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1. EXPLANATION OF "PROTECTED PERSONS" UNDER THE
CIVILIAN CONVENTION
An important initial inquiry for each of the Geneva
Conventions is a determination of which persons are protected
under each convention. Under the terms of the Civilian
Convention, nationals of neutral states (such as Jordan,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) "who find themselves in the
territory of a belligerent State" are not protected persons as
defined in Article Four.33 Occupied territory, however, is no
longer "the territory of a belligerent state"; therefore, nationals
of neutral states automatically gain the status of protected
persons when occupation begins. Several passages from the
authoritative ICRC/Pictet Commentary to the Fourth Geneva
Convention directly respond to arguments advanced by
Goldsmith in his memorandum. For example, the ICRCfPictet
Commentary explains: "[I]n occupied territory [nationals of
neutral States] are protected persons and the Convention is
applicable to them ...
Accordingly, under this interpretation, nationals of neutral
states during occupation are persons protected by Article 49 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention and cannot be subjected to
transfer or deportation through extraordinary rendition.
It seems appropriate at this juncture to be reminded of the
historical context of Article 49. In 1935, all German Jews were
stripped of their "citizenship"35 in preparation for their
deportation.36 This historical background sheds light on Pictet's
use of quotation marks in the following passage from the ICRC
Commentary on Article 49, which was also quoted by Goldsmith:
There is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful
recollections called forth by the "deportations" of the Second World
War, for they are still present in everyone's memory. ... The thought
of the physical and mental suffering endured by these "displaced
persons" . .. can only lead to thankfulness for the prohibition embodied
in this paragraph, which is intended to forbid such hateful practices
for all time.
3 7
Here, Pictet is recalling a lesson of history: what an
33. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 11, art. 4.
34. PICTET, CILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 48.
35. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Competing Frameworks for Assessing
Contemporary Holocaust-Era Claims, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 107, n.84 (2001).
36. Id. at n.85 (citing the November 25, 1941 decree called the "elfte
Verordnung zum reichsbirgergesetz").
37. PICTET, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 278-79.
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occupying power may call a "deportation" under local
immigration law may actually be a pretense to serve some
sinister purpose.
2. EXPLANATION OF TEMPORARY TRANSFERS
As to Iraqi or Afghan nationals, who are clearly protected
persons in the context of an occupation, as well as the assorted
other nationals found in those countries, Goldsmith makes a
second argument that Article 49 would permit temporary
transnational relocation to facilitate interrogation. The
ICRC/Pictet Commentary, which was prepared
contemporaneously with the drafting of the Geneva
Conventions, clearly indicates the erroneous nature of the
Goldsmith argument because Article 49 was intended to apply
to "the treatment of protected persons accused of offences or
serving sentences." 38
IV. ADDRESSING THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
A. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF
2006
In early 2006 we stated that federal habeas statute presents
a mechanism enabling persons subjected to extraordinary
rendition to challenge their detention in U.S. courts.3 9 The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) alters the availability
of habeas corpus as a form of redress in U.S. courts for persons
detained in the "war on terror." A careful examination of the
MCA demonstrates, however, that habeas corpus is still a viable
mechanism for challenging the practice of extraordinary
rendition.
1. Sources of Rights
The MCA makes two significant changes to U.S. law which
could strip persons of habeas rights. First, it states that "[n]o
person may invoke the Geneva Conventions . . .in any habeas
38. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
39. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (2006).
382 [Vol. 16:2
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corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United
States . . . is a party as a source of rights in any court of the
United States."40  A person alleging that his or her
extraordinary rendition is in violation of the Geneva
Conventions, however, need not rely on the conventions
themselves as a "source of rights," because the War Crimes Act
establishes that grave breaches of the conventions are a crime
under U.S. law. Hence, a federal statute is the "source of
rights," and it makes use of the Geneva Conventions as an
interpretive tool, rather than as an independent source of rights.
Moreover, the MCA itself confirms that certain acts are grave
breaches of the conventions and therefore constitute War
Crimes under the federal criminal code.41 A similar argument
could be presented as to the use of the Geneva Conventions to
interpret the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Restrictions on Availability of Habeas Corpus
The MCA amends the habeas corpus statute to add the
following provision:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination. 42
There are several reasons why this provision does not strip
courts of habeas jurisdiction over persons subjected to
extraordinary rendition.
First, a person who has been transferred to the custody of
third country is not "detained by the United States." The terms
of the habeas statute do not require that a person be "in
custody" of a U.S. official in order for habeas rights to apply.43
Second, persons subjected to extraordinary rendition have
not been determined to be enemy combatants. The MCA
specifically provides for persons to be determined to be
"unlawful enemy combatant[s]" by a "Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the
40. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, § 5(a) (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2241 Note).
41. See id. § 6(b) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
42. Id. § 7(a) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
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authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense." 44 There
is no process by which these individuals are determined to have
any combatant status, and they are generally transferred by the
CIA, not the Department of Defense. Yet even if a person has
not been determined to be an enemy combatant, the MCA
provides that habeas is not available if the person is "awaiting
such determination." Because persons outside of the U.S.
detention facility at Guantdnamo Bay have no access to any
"competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense," they are not "awaiting"
any determination of their enemy combatant status.
Third, even if there is evidence that a person subjected to
extraordinary rendition has been properly found to be an
"enemy combatant," the conditions of extraordinary rendition
demonstrate that the person is not "properly detained" as an
enemy combatant, because the detention resulting from
extraordinary rendition violates the Geneva Conventions and
presents a serious risk of torture.
Fourth, the "determination" requirement bars applicability
of the habeas-stripping provisions to persons subject to
extraordinary rendition. The MCA provides that some persons
may be determined to be unlawful enemy combatants without a
determination by a "competent tribunal." These individuals are
not, however, "determined" to be unlawful enemy combatants;
rather, they simply acquire that status because they "halve]
engaged in hostilities or. . . ha[ve] purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents" and are "not a lawful enemy combatant (including
a person who -is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces)." 45 Yet even if a person could be properly labeled an
enemy combatant under those terms, the revisions to the habeas
statute only bar jurisdiction for people "who ha[ve] been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or [are] awaiting such determination."46
The MCA only uses the words determined and determination in
the context of a finding of a "competent tribunal," and not in the
context of a person simply having engaged in hostilities or
supported hostilities against the United States.47
44. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, § 3(a)(1) (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(ii)).
45. Id. § 3(a)(1) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i)).
46. Id. § 7(a) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) (emphasis added).
47. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 948a(a)(i) (defining an unlawful enemy combatant as
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In conclusion, by the very terms of the Military
Commissions Act, habeas corpus is still available as a remedy
for persons subjected to extraordinary rendition.
B. REMEDIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Because extraordinary rendition by definition takes place
on the soil of countries other than the United States, U.S.
officials involved in the practice are vulnerable to criminal
prosecution and civil suits in the countries where they conduct
extraordinary rendition activities. Prosecutors in Italy, for
example, have brought charges against over twenty CIA agents
who are alleged to have conducted an extraordinary rendition on
Italian soil. Yet when the Geneva Conventions are implicated,
some countries may exercise prosecutorial authority over the
responsible individuals regardless of any territorial link.
Countries such as Germany recognize universal jurisdiction as a
means to fulfill their Geneva Convention obligation to ensure
respect for humanitarian law. Therefore, a prosecutor in
Germany is presently considering issuing an indictment against
Donald Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials for the abuses at Abu
Ghraib and Guantdnamo. Private individuals or organizations
could bring a similar complaint against the officials responsible
for extraordinary renditions that violate the Geneva
Conventions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Military Commissions Act arguably eliminates access
to U.S. courts for individuals who enjoy a certain level of bene
detentus status because they have access to competent tribunals
to ascertain whether they are enemy combatants. Yet for
individuals subject to extraordinary rendition, the mala
detentus nature of their confinement leaves open the door to
U.S. courts. Moreover, foreign jurisdictions are also able to
"a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or
associated forces)"), with id. § 948a(a)(ii) (providing in the alternative that an
unlawful enemy combatant may be "a person who, before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary
of Defense" (emphasis added)).
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address the illegal practice of extraordinary rendition through
prosecution of the responsible individuals-either through
standard domestic criminal law, by invoking universal
jurisdiction, or by using civil suits.
